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ABSTRACT: According to the quantificational (neo-)Quinean model in meta-ontology, the 
question of ontology boils down to the question of whether a sortal property is 
exemplified. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical 
reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the exemplification 
relation from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds and having in mind this stand 
in ontology. I distinguish two notions of resemblance, object-to-object and object-to-kind, 
and show the problems with both of them. Finally, I argue for a better awareness of the 
implicit “bias” involved in the very notion of “resemblance”, without indulging in Quine’s 
veto towards this notion.  
  
 
I. 
 
Notwithstanding the recent neo-Aristotelian renaissance (Schaffer 2009; 
Tahko 2012; Tahko 2012; Correia & Schnieder 2012; Hoeltje, Schnieder and 
Steinberg 2013; Novotný and Novák 2014) and the deflationist neo-
Carnapian view that never really went away (Hirsch 2011; Price 2009; 
Thomasson 2015), contemporary literature in meta-ontology seems to 
confirm that the quantificational approach is still the "normal paradigm".1 
According to the classic, (neo-)Quinean quantificational approach to 
ontology, the question of what exists is to be solved through a paraphrase 
into canonical notation of our theory T, assigning the ontological 
commitment of T to the values of the quantified variables of the (true) 
sentences of T. From this point of view, the form of the ontological 
commitment of a sentence such as “Fs exist” is “There are Fs”, understood 
as “There is at least one x such that Fx”. Consequently, existence is not a 
property of individuals; according to this model, it is indeed incoherent to 
state an additional property of existence to xs in case of a predication 
about xs: existence is prior to predication.2 
In conformity with this perspective, the ontological commitment of a 
predication about individuals does not inform us about what individuals 
exist (all of them do), but rather about what sortal properties are 
exemplified. In fact, unlike other meta-ontological models such as Lowe’s,3 
a Quinean approach does not distinguish between exemplification and 
instantiation. In other words, assuming the classical Principle of 
Instantiation, according to which we need to acknowledge all and only the 
kinds that are instantiated, the quantificational approach answers the 
 
RESEMBLANCE, EXEMPLIFICATION AND ONTOLOGY 
2 
 
question of ontology specifying the non-empty kinds. Subsequently, the 
question whether Fs exist can be reduced to that of whether F is 
exemplified, where F is a sortal property.  
Since the question of ontology in the quantificational form relies essentially 
on exemplification, the transparency of this latter concept seems to be 
crucial to defend the (neo-)Quinean approach. In this paper, I want to draw 
attention to some complications that arise when we try to specify how we 
should actually proceed in correlating individuals and kinds that those 
individuals exemplify, from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds 
and having in mind this stand in ontology. The choice of conceptualism is 
justified as, apparently, the least “metaphysical” alternative to a strong 
realism about universals and properties, without assuming necessarily a 
strict nominalistic stance.4 The advantage is that, if we please, we may 
interpret the kinds we build as conceptual tools without ontological 
counterparts, but we are not forced to do so. Therefore, the strategy 
seems more powerful than demanding. In addition, conceptualism seems 
to fit the Principle of Instantiation at its best, since it does not acknowledge 
kinds that are not exemplified. With this restriction in mind, my attempt 
can be also be read as a way to test if conceptualism is actually the most 
viable strategy to account for exemplification with the purpose of 
defending the quantificational approach in meta-ontology. Being, in my 
opinion, this strategy crucial for the quantification approach, this test may 
be nonetheless interesting per se, even if we do not share the standard 
(neo-)Quinean ontological commitment criterion, as it can also be read as a 
test of conceptualism as such. One of the conclusions of this conceptual 
analysis will be that the kinds involved in the exemplification required by 
this ontological model are best considered as “quasi-natural”. 
 
 
II. 
 
From a conceptualist point of view, in building a philosophical 
reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the 
exemplification relation, one may take advantage of the notions of 
“similarity” or “resemblance”. On closer inspection, it seems better to 
distinguish (at least) two types of “resemblance”: we can grasp, or build, 
kinds thanks to an object-to-object resemblance (OOR) or link individuals 
to kinds thanks to an object-to-kind resemblance (OKR). Overlooking their 
irrelevant differences, we focus on resemblances among individuals to 
grasp, or build, general cases, which result from selective acts of grouping 
for the sake of our representation, or conceptualization (OOR). By relying 
on the general cases thus built, we are able to associate other individuals 
with kinds, to which they are similar (OKR). Unfortunately, in the analysis of 
the theoretical knowledge embedded in human representation of kinds, 
types and categories, it is commonly assumed that, while playing a crucial 
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role in our capability to extend limited samples to general paradigms of 
“typical cases”, the concepts of “resemblance” and “similarity” are notions 
worthy of further philosophical and conceptual clarification. Therefore, the 
previous picture is in need of further clarification, for it recalls notions 
known to be puzzling.  
The easy way to do the job seems to be the reduction of the notion of 
resemblance to more manageable notions such as set membership. The 
basic idea is that, assuming the set of individuals I:{I1, I2, …, In} and the set 
of predicates P:{P1, P2, …, Pn}, we should be able, for any Ii, to pair the 
appropriate Pi or Pi, in the easiest case in which properties do not come 
in degree. In order to accomplish this task, we assume to be always 
possible, for any Ii, to determine whether Pi holds, but we can grant this 
point for the sake of simplicity. According to this picture, we should be able 
to select the subset Si of I such that all the members of Si are the members 
of I for which the property expressed by the predicate Pi holds and the 
complement of Si is the set of all the members of I for which the property 
expressed by the predicate Pi holds. The subsets of I may or may not 
overlap, partially or completely, since we are not imposing any restriction 
to the combination of properties. We can now define two or more 
individuals “object-to-object similar” relatively to the property Pi if they are 
members of the same subset Si of I selected according to the property Pi.  
A first provisional conclusion seems to be that OOR requires the choice of a 
property that selects the intended way to generate the subset. Visibly, this 
stratagem works in theory only. Complications arise when we consider 
both that the individuals we need to classify do not come with a list of 
favored properties for the sake of our conceptual work, and that, at least 
theoretically, all choices are of equal value. Everything is, in fact, “similar” 
to everything else in some respect.5  
 
 
III. 
 
An attempt to improve this strategy is notably discussed in Quine 1969, 
which develops it by means of a comparison such as “I1 is more similar to I2 
than I3” if I1 and I2 are jointly members to more sets than I1 and I3. 
However, since sets are generated by the exhaustion of combinations, the 
number of sets to which any two elements jointly belong is not determined 
by the features shown by those elements, i.e. their similarity, but rather by 
the total number of elements.6 The recent literature tries to avoid the 
issues raised by theory of sets, trying to adopt a more restricted notion of 
kind with different strategies, although it is not clear how successfully.7 
This may not be a problem if we are merely considering the possible 
combination of properties, but it seems to be relevant if our interest is not 
formal but rather ontological.  
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There might be choices that we consider unwanted or unfitting, but, 
clearly, we need first to set our aims and the context, according to which 
we build our sense of what is appropriate or fitting  – that is, we need a 
generating principle that we can trust in producing the correct, or suitable, 
grouping for our aims. The big problem being, at this point, that aims are 
chosen from an evaluative perspective, which spins data in a certain 
direction with reference to a preferred perspective among the many 
possible.  
This difficulty was remarkably observed by Kant in a quick note of the 
Critique of Judgment: “[mere logic] teaches how one can compare a given 
representation with others, and, by extracting what it has in common with 
others, as a characteristic for general use, form a concept. But about 
whether for each object nature has many others to put forth as objects of 
comparison, which have much in common with the first in their form, it 
teaches us nothing; rather, this condition of the possibility of the 
application of logic to nature is a principle of the representation of nature 
as a system for our power of judgment, in which the manifold, divided into 
genera and species, makes it possible to bring all the natural forms that are 
forthcoming to concepts (of greater or lesser generality) through 
comparison”.8 
If, on the one hand, it seems puzzling to find a red thread that guides us 
through the different ways of grouping a variety of objects of a given 
domain in absence of an a priori strategy of intended relevant properties 
and a hierarchy of preferences (OOR), on the other hand we expect it to be 
easier to find the right association between a new case and one of the 
kinds once the correct grouping is given (OKR). Unfortunately, if we are not 
able to specify the strategy of the intended relevant properties and the 
hierarchy of preferences, empirical data as such do not help us do the job. 
The grouping, even when correct, does not come with a label specifying 
the reason why the individuals are gathered. In this case, we need to 
specify an additional object-to-kind similarity that allows us to choose 
among several properties of a given object in order to match it to the right 
kind. 
It should then be clear that, when we take in consideration proprieties that 
come in degrees, and the greatest part of our properties do, the 
complications ramify exponentially and the interference among alternative 
ordering strategies requires further decisions in giving sense to the data 
under investigation. Therefore, the previous arguments might apply once 
again, multiplied in number. However, we may ignore these further 
ramifications, since we are considering here sortal properties, which are 
not assumed to come in degree. 
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IV. 
 
The philosophical worry about the notion of OOR in generating categories 
and OKR in associating an individual to the proper kind seems reinforced by 
experimental psychology. With reference to saliency parameters, empirical 
results confirm that participants in experiments in categorization and 
similarity rating produce different patterns of classification guided by 
theoretical assumptions about the properties they handle, and show that 
the configuration of features plays a crucial role in category classification. 
Rehder & Hastie 2001 and Ahn & Kim 2000, for instance, show how 
theoretical knowledge, and in particular causal knowledge, imposes a 
structure to our beliefs about categories and “supports projections that 
enable people to ‘go beyond the information given’”.9 The impact of this 
factor is so relevant that Rehder & Hastie 2001 concludes: “Although the 
old saying goes that ‘Experience is only half of experience’, in the present 
research we found that ‘Experience is much less than half of 
experience’”.10 
The bottom line, endorsed by Quine himself, might be that we should be 
suspicious of the very idea of a single taxonomy of kinds or of a unique 
correct grouping of individuals established independently of any 
consideration about what should count as a relevant or perspicuous 
property. For instance, LaPorte 2004 suggests that “naturalness” is a 
matter of degree and proposes a tolerant and pluralistic view: “the taxa 
recognized by different systems of classification may be natural in different 
respects”.11 “Relevant” and “perspicuous” are indeed pragmatic and 
evaluative qualities. If we are suspicious of any pragmatic and evaluative 
injection in our science, we may well conclude that the very notion of 
similarity and kind are to be dispensed with and even that “we can take it 
as a very special mark of the maturity of a branch of science that it no 
longer needs an irreducible notion of the similarity and kind”.12  
Nevertheless, this conclusion is far from being mandatory, or appealing. If 
we are justified in mistrusting the necessity of any particular structure of 
ideal types based on similarity, it does not follow that our ontology can do 
without a scheme or hierarchical taxonomy. Some strategy for ordering in 
perspicuous kinds seems to be in need, even though this might take us to 
determine the ordering case by case, according to our theoretical concerns 
and by evaluating the consequences of each choice, taking in consideration 
our field of interest and the practical nature of our aims. In this case, we 
speak in terms of “conceptual schemes” or “categorial frameworks” as the 
guiding background of our grouping options, which determine the 
acknowledgment of a certain structure of kinds instead of another.  
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V. 
 
The notion of kind is essentially involved in the background assumption 
that makes sense of the ontological commitment criterion. We may well 
debate if there is a thing per se such as a natural kind or if that is merely a 
theoretical strategy we implement in order to give our various, different 
data a more functional manageability. However, it seems out of doubt that 
we assume at least a concept of kind in asking, through the ontological 
commitment, whether a kind is exemplified. Also, the metaphysical 
intricacy of this very notion has further ramifications in the application 
phase of this ontological model, which requires our “best theories” as a 
basis for ontology. However the idea of our “best theories” may be 
understood, it needs to include the theories which best account for our 
empirical observations. 
The very idea of “kinds” suggests that the individual cases we test in 
controlled experiments result in the same outcome, given the same 
conditions, since they exhibit the same sortal property (nature, disposition, 
essence).13 We may be tempted to identify this “common nature” with an 
ideal entity, which turns to be our real object of study of  natural sciences. 
In a first-stage research phase, such a kind is gained through an act of 
empirical abstraction, with a rather thin inductive base and a thick 
metaphysical assumption: we observe a (relatively small) amount of 
individual cases in controlled experiments, looking for what the individual 
cases share, with the aim of grasping the pertinent sortal property they 
exhibit, via OOR. In a second-stage phase, researchers need to determine, 
via OKR, which kind the individual cases exemplify.   
These ideal kinds may be either stipulated (a) or real (b).  
(a) If they are fictitious models stipulated in order to give sense to 
experimental data, they may work with the conjectural research or the 
theoretical assessment of experiments although their ontological import is 
less clear. At least if ontology has to save its connection with our best 
scientific theories, which this ontological model requires.  
(b) Apparently, when ontology is concerned, we are interested in real 
kinds, rather than in kinds resulting from acts of grouping built artificially 
on the interests and decisions of human beings. Or, paradoxically, our 
particular interest in this case is the discovery of taxonomies and 
classifications that correspond to real kinds in nature and not our particular 
interests and decisions. Therefore, a simple reply to the previous concerns 
could be that some similarities are less relevant than others, from an 
objective point of view, without bringing any evaluation or particular 
preferences in. We could select, for instance, only those factors that 
usually play a role in “our best theories” and, once we have restricted the 
variations to this limited field of factors, or in case of multiple alternative 
classifications according to those factors, we might introduce a hierarchy of 
preference according to their likely relevance.  
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Now, there are at least two main levels of difficulties with this strategy. The 
first level is more general and concerns the fact-value distinction; the 
second level is more specific to what counts as our “best theories” in case 
of empirical observations.  
From the general point of view, there is a widespread agreement that the 
fact-value dichotomy cannot be simply assumed without qualification, 
since there are good reasons to suspect that a strict distinction between 
factual statements and evaluative statements is nothing short of a 
philosophical myth. Referring to the standard literature on the topic,14 it is 
enough here to mention that requesting an objective, factual point of view 
with no mention of values and decisions as a way out from the previous 
troubles with OOR and OKR similarity involves difficulties that are as 
challenging as the ones we are tackling, if not worse. 
From a more specific point of view, requesting a selection of the only 
factors that objectively play a role in connection with our best theories 
conflicts with the evidence that we do not know in advance which factors 
do and which do not play a role in a specific research domain. In order to 
comply with this request, we should be able to identify significant sets in 
advance in order to make sense of our data in the first place. In fact, data 
themselves do not come with a specification of what should count as the 
relevant property for a certain group in order to account for the results we 
get.15 Furthermore, focusing exclusively on the factors that we “know” 
usually play a role could even make us blind to those variables that we 
excluded a priori: a selection that trades the feasibility of the inquiry at the 
expenses of our unbiased freedom of research.  
An additional problem, with the second part of the suggestion concerning 
the hierarchy of preference according to the likely relevance of factors, is 
that a hierarchy requires further criteria that need to be disclosed. Even if 
we imagine reaching an agreement on such criteria, there is the additional 
problem that the likeliness of their relevance relies on previous results and 
on the way the previous research has been conducted, limiting once again 
our ability to consider the data from innovative and unforeseen points of 
view, taking in consideration aspects that have been neglected. 
We already know that fictitious models to make sense of empirical data 
based on our interests and decisions have little use for our applicative 
aims. A provisional conclusion is that looking for independent taxonomies 
and classifications without bringing evaluations or preferences into the 
field does not seem to work as well. 
 
 
VI. 
 
This train of considerations does not necessarily conflict with our practical 
strategy to work with ideal models and kinds. Actually, there is no other 
way to do the job. In fact, I am not contesting a kinds-based approach to 
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our scientific research, favoring a yet-to-clarify “alternative” approach. 
Rather, I am just suggesting that being aware of such complications may be 
useful in reminding us that any act of modeling through OOR and OKR is 
“biased”, if you are willing to use such an expression, and that this limit is 
unavoidable. When I question the “natural” character of kinds reached via 
resemblance, I do not want to suggest that, since they are, at least 
partially, human creations, they are arbitrary and no one grouping is more 
correct than any other. If natural kinds are natural insofar as they lead to 
groups of natural objects that behave with a regularity independent of 
conscious human activity, their objectivity rests on the objectivity of 
natural laws.16 What I am questioning is the fact that, while not completely 
dependent on human interests and decisions, they are taken to be 
completely independent. The mere fact that there are available 
alternatives, which are equally justified categorizations of the same data, 
raises doubts about their complete independence. Moreover, that one 
grouping is more correct than others can be justified only when it is 
possible to disclose the a priori set of criteria, preferences and choices that 
generate our ontological categorization of individual cases in general kinds.  
When we speak of different alternatives in fixing the categorial frameworks 
of our taxonomy of kinds, each based on different assumptions of 
preferences and choices  –  pragmatic and evaluative decisions included  –  
we should avoid the risk of suggesting a relativist approach to our ordering 
strategies. On the other hand, in order to avoid any form of relativism, 
kinds must be independent from our decisions and preferences in selecting 
the pertinent resemblance for the sake of our acts of conceptualization. 
The problem being, at this point, that the crucial strategy of the 
conceptualist approach is to reduce kinds to sortal properties and sortal 
properties to results of an act of abstraction through OOR. However, kinds 
cannot be wholly dependent on conceptual schemes or categorical 
frameworks if we take this to mean that concepts and categorizations 
themselves generate kinds as such. This enigmatic act of institution is much 
more than any of our acts of abstraction can do. Kinds can be said to 
depend on conceptual schemes or categorial frameworks in the following 
sense: questions on existence or reality can only be asked relative to some 
background assumptions that cannot be found, as such, in our data.17  
For this reason, I prefer to consider these kinds quasi-natural, since they 
are “natural” in the sense that they are not arbitrary and they are 
intimately connected with natural laws, but they are not “natural” if we 
intend “natural” as “opposed to kinds resulting from acts of grouping built 
on the interests and decisions of human beings”.  
Therefore, when we build categorizations of individuals using quasi-natural 
kinds, we can keep an eye open to the always-available alternative 
ordering strategies. The risk, in fact, is to forget that taxonomies and 
classifications that we have been using for a long time sound “natural”, 
thus preventing us from exploring new territories. In selecting relevant 
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properties guiding our taxonomies in kinds, we should not look 
condescendingly at manifestation of preferences in assessing our aims, as it 
was the case with an old positivistic attitude towards science in general 
and taxonomic theories in particular. Even with reference to the most 
applicative field of the most empirical sciences, the best objective results 
can be gained when we face frankly the possibility that our preferential 
evaluative subjective perspective may be our best guide in organizing the 
data. It may indeed seem too hazardous to give space to a partial 
creativeness, but the risky face of the subjective qualification of such a 
perspective may just be neglecting or hiding the relevance of a factor that 
seems embedded in the very notion of resemblance and it is inescapable 
anyway.  
The problem with implicit bias is that they are implicit. An improved 
conceptualistic account of kinds based on the two notions of resemblance, 
OOR and OKR, should consider a more creative and responsible approach, 
which can be gained when the previous implications are not omitted or 
kept quiet, as if they were a birthmark that stains the purity of science. 
These implications have important ramifications on many related questions 
such as: the investigation of cognitively adequate ontological 
representations; the problem of the reliability of the source of information 
and the contribution of interests and preferences in data handling and 
manipulation; the investigation of the rationales for the selection of the 
concepts that are relevant for our ontology. 
It is desirable that in future research, alongside a disclosure of financial 
interests, scientific studies and applications find the space to think at the 
preferences and interests that guided the ontological framework of 
singular cases in kinds, since there are so many different ways to organize 
objects in categories and so many different ways to justify the choices we 
made.   
  
 
University of Milan, Italy 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Cf., for instance, Chalmers-Manley-Wasserman 2009 (in particular, Kit Fine on p. 
157); Van Inwagen 2001, pp. 13-31; Berto & Plebani 2015; cf. also the 
presentation given in Tahko 2015, which is written by a neo-Aristotelian but 
remains neutral on the topic.  
2 For a comprehensive presentation of the ontological commitment as a paradigm 
for meta-ontology cf. Valore 2016.  
3 Cf. Lowe 2006. 
4 For a contemporary version of conceptualism and formal ontology, cf. 
Cocchiarella 2007. 
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5 Cf. Valore 2016, pp. 185-187. 
6 Cf. Quine 1969, pp. 114-138. 
7 Cf. Bird & Tobin 2016; Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary 2010a; Campbell, O'Rourke, & 
Slater 2011. 
8 More accurately, it is a note in the so-called “First Introduction” to the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, i.e. the introduction that Kant decided not to publish 
and replaced with a completely different text. Cf. Kant 2002, pp. 15-16, note 
marked by *. Cf. also Husserl 2001, Investigation Two, §4, pp. 242-243. 
9 Rehder & Hastie 2001, p. 323 
10 Rehder & Hastie 2001, p. 354. 
11 La Porte 2004, p. 27. 
12 Quine 1969, pp. 137-138. 
13 I am not committing to any of these alternatives nor do I want to touch upon 
the question of the nature of dispositions and essences. Whether the notion of 
kind implies necessarily an ontology of essences, discovered through scientific 
investigation and determining the extensions of our natural kind concepts, is a 
matter of debate. Classical references are Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1975, which 
focus on the essences of natural kinds of substances, such as water and gold. Bird 
& Tobin 2016 outlines the fundamental positions for natural kinds in general. The 
question of essence is an extremely thorny one, since it seems to call 
metaphysical necessity into discourse, with the need of a further clarification of 
this kind of necessity. On the other side, it is questionable that any reference to 
essences need to (or can) be expressed in terms of a prior notion of metaphysical 
necessity, and we may also consider a stipulative “Kripkean” account, according to 
which the natural kinds are just those kinds that obey Kripkean semantics. Cf. Fine 
1994 and Lowe 2007. 
14 Cf. Putnam 2004; Marchetti & Marchetti 2016. 
15 A case study from biomedical research is provided in Valore 2017. On the 
nature of natural kinds in biology and medicine, cf. Roy 1998; for a synthetic 
presentation of the philosophical debate on natural kinds in special sciences, cf. 
Bird & Tobin 2016, § 2. 
16 Cf. Riggs 1996. 
17 Cf. Valore 2016, pp. 233-235. 
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